01
Specify
Define the actual performance required for the building and application.
Decisions · Responsibility · Human Safety
Every outcome starts with a decision.
Materials do not decide where they are used. People do.
A product does not reduce a specification. It does not approve a cheaper substitution. It does not interpret a test report. It does not remove a cavity barrier. It does not change the installation.
People specify. People manufacture. People test. People certify. People approve. People install. People inspect.
That does not make material performance less important. It makes informed human decisions even more important.
Before the building
Buildings are built through decisions.
A completed facade is the result of hundreds of connected decisions.
The question should never stop at “what material was used?”
We also need to understand who selected it, why it was selected, what system was tested, what was approved, what changed and what was finally installed.
02
Evaluate
Understand the material, complete wall and evidence supporting it.
03
Approve
Know exactly what is being accepted and whether substitutions change performance.
04
Install
Build what was approved and respect every safety-critical detail.
05
Verify
Confirm that the completed building represents the approved solution.
Before Grenfell
The warnings were already global.
Grenfell did not happen in a world that had never seen rapid facade fire spread.
Years before June 2017, serious fires had occurred across the United States, China, South Korea, France, Turkey, Russia, the UAE, Australia and the United Kingdom.
The construction details were not identical. The materials were not identical. The ignition sources were not identical. And not every incident involved ACP.
But taken together, they were warning us about combustible external-wall components, cavities, insulation, geometry, fire stopping, installation and the possibility of fire moving outside normal compartmentation.
Different countries. Different buildings. Different materials. One repeated question: did we understand the complete wall before we approved it?
Global facade fire history
Incidents we should keep learning from.
North America
External wall warning2007
The Water Club
Atlantic City · USA
ACP / PE core reported
During construction, fire spread rapidly up the exterior of the 41-storey tower. Published fire-safety literature has identified aluminium composite panel cladding with a polyethylene core in the facade. There were no fatalities.
China
Multiple major facade fires2009
Television Cultural Centre
Beijing · China
Combustible insulation
The 34-storey building suffered a major external fire and one firefighter died. Grenfell Inquiry facade-expert evidence identified extruded polystyrene insulation as suspected and also noted insufficient cavity barriers.
2010
Jiaozhou Road
Shanghai · China
58 lives lost
A devastating renovation fire killed 58 people. Grenfell Inquiry expert evidence identifies polyurethane foam insulation as a suspected contributor to the rapid external spread. The tragedy remains an important reminder that construction activity and combustible facade components can create a dangerous combination.
2011
Royal Wanxin / Wanxin Complex
Shenyang · China
ACM + insulation
A major external fire affected the hotel complex. Grenfell Inquiry facade evidence records ACM panels together with extruded and expanded polystyrene insulation as being involved.
South Korea
Facade geometry matters2010
Wooshin Golden Suites
Busan · South Korea
ACM / PE core
Fire began on the fourth floor and spread rapidly up the exterior to the top of the 38-storey building. Published fire research identifies polyethylene-core aluminium composite cladding and combustible insulation. The U-shaped facade geometry also created a chimney-like path for rapid vertical spread. Five people were injured.
Europe
Different materials · same need to understand2005
Treskowstrasse
Berlin · Germany
EPS insulation
A residential facade fire involving expanded polystyrene insulation resulted in two deaths. The incident appears in the Grenfell Inquiry facade expert's review of earlier international fires.
2009
Lakanal House
London · United Kingdom
6 lives lost
Six people died. The Grenfell Inquiry later described widespread compartmentation failure, external fire spread and combustible window panels that did not comply with Building Regulations. This happened eight years before Grenfell.
2010
4 Rue du Lac
Dijon · France
7 lives lost
Seven people died in this residential building fire. Grenfell Inquiry facade evidence records combustible insulation as part of the external-wall fire history.
2012
Mermoz Tower
Roubaix · France
ACM cladding
Fire originating in a dwelling propagated through decorative ACM panels on the balconies. One person died and multiple apartments were destroyed. The incident is specifically documented in published ACM facade-fire research.
2012
Polat Tower
Istanbul · Türkiye
Facade fire
A major external fire affected the 42-storey tower. Published ACM fire literature records the incident, while Grenfell Inquiry evidence also discusses combustible insulation. There were no reported fatalities.
2013
Grozny-City Tower
Grozny · Russia
Exterior fire
A spectacular fire spread over the exterior of the high-rise complex. Published ACM facade-fire research includes the incident in its review of international facade fires. No fatalities were reported.
2017
Grenfell Tower
London · United Kingdom
72 lives lost
The defining modern facade-fire tragedy. The Inquiry found that PE-core ACM panels were principally responsible for the rapid external fire spread, but its final report documented a much wider chain of failures involving products, design, testing, certification, procurement, regulation and responsibility.
Australia
Fire · Audit · Remediation2014
Lacrosse Tower
Melbourne · Australia
ACP facade
A balcony fire spread rapidly over the external wall from level 6 upward. The event became central to Australia's combustible-cladding debate and ultimately contributed to major building audits, litigation and remediation.
2019
Neo200
Melbourne · Australia
ACP / PE reported
Fire started on a balcony and spread vertically along an ACP strip from around level 22 to level 27. CSIRO records that newspaper reporting identified the cladding as ACP-PE. More than 200 residents were evacuated.
Look across the incidents
The material changed. The questions repeated.
These buildings did not all use the same facade. That is exactly the point.
ACM appears in several incidents. EPS, XPS and polyurethane insulation appear in others. Geometry, cavities, missing fire stopping and construction conditions also appear.
We learn more by studying these differences than by forcing every incident into one narrative.
01
Combustible components
Panels, insulation and other materials can contribute differently to fire growth.
02
Facade geometry
Re-entrant corners, channels and cavities can influence flame and hot-gas movement.
03
Compartmentation
Fire stopping and cavity barriers can be critical to limiting hidden external spread.
04
Human decisions
Someone specifies, changes, approves, installs and verifies every component.
72
Lives lost · 14 June 2017
Grenfell Tower
Not an abstract technical failure. People lost their lives.
Seventy-two people died. Families lost parents, children, brothers, sisters, relatives and friends.
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry concluded that all 72 deaths were avoidable.
It found that the PE-core ACM rainscreen panels were principally responsible for the rapid external fire spread. Other combustible products, including insulation, also contributed.
But the Inquiry did not finish its work by naming the cladding.
Its final report examined the organisations and people behind the refurbishment, product manufacturers, testing and certification, architects, contractors, consultants, building control, government and regulation.
That is important. The material tells us how the fire could spread. The decision history helps us understand how that material and system reached the building.
Personal
My heart goes to every family who lost someone at Grenfell, every survivor and the wider community. They remain in my daily prayers. For me this can never become only another technical case study.
Years of evidence
A chain of failures.
The final Inquiry report runs across seven volumes.
That alone tells us something important: Grenfell cannot responsibly be reduced to a three-word explanation about cladding.
Cost influenced choices.
Procurement and value engineering formed part of the refurbishment decision process.
Material performance mattered.
PE-core ACM made a major contribution to rapid external fire spread.
The panel was not alone.
Combustible insulation also formed part of the external-wall system.
Evidence must be trustworthy.
The Inquiry made serious findings about product testing and marketing.
Documents need understanding.
Certificates do not replace competent evaluation of their actual scope.
The whole wall matters.
Designers must understand the materials, interfaces and regulatory requirements.
The safety net must work.
Critical problems should be identified before construction is accepted.
Responsibility cannot disappear.
Multiple stakeholders should not mean that nobody owns the final decision.
72 avoidable deaths.
That is why the lessons must remain bigger than one product category.
The question
Was the material the whole problem? No.
This does not mean material selection was unimportant. At Grenfell it was critically important.
But saying only “the cladding was unsafe” leaves out the next questions.
Why was that particular product selected? What was originally specified? What changed? What information was available? Who evaluated the evidence? Who approved the construction? Why did the regulatory system not stop it?
When public discussion becomes only about banning a product name, there is a danger that we stop asking the harder questions.
The material matters.
The system matters.
The evidence matters.
The decision matters.
The system matters.
The evidence matters.
The decision matters.
United Arab Emirates
Fires happened. The code evolved.
The UAE also experienced a series of dramatic high-rise facade fires.
Several involved older combustible aluminium composite cladding systems.
The response was not simply to stop using the words ACP or ACM. Requirements progressively became much deeper around materials, assemblies, testing, Civil Defence approval, inspection and stakeholder responsibility.
2010
Al Kuwait Tower · Sharjah
An early UAE high-rise facade fire during the period before later, stronger facade requirements.
2012
Al Baker Tower · Sharjah
A major residential tower fire that became part of the UAE's growing focus on combustible exterior cladding.
2012
Al Tayer Tower · Sharjah
Fire spread rapidly over the exterior. Grenfell Inquiry expert evidence specifically records ACM panels in this incident.
2012
Saif Belhasa Building · Dubai
One of several UAE facade fires specifically raised during evidence before the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.
2012
Tamweel Tower · Dubai
The JLT tower suffered severe external fire spread. Published ACM research specifically includes Tamweel among major ACM facade fires.
2015
The Torch · Dubai Marina
A dramatic high-rise facade fire again focused attention on older combustible exterior cladding systems.
2015
Address Downtown · Dubai
The New Year's Eve fire became one of the important events considered during development of the revised UAE Fire and Life Safety Code.
2016
Sulafa Tower · Dubai Marina
Another major external fire reinforced concern about older towers constructed before strengthened facade requirements.
2017
The Torch · Second Fire
Dubai Civil Defence reported that a discarded cigarette started the fire. The event again demonstrated how a small ignition can become a major facade event.
2018
Zen Tower · Dubai Marina
Investigators reported that the fire began in a ground-floor commercial kitchen before spreading through the building.
2020
Abbco Tower · Sharjah
The older tower contained combustible aluminium cladding installed before later requirements prohibited such high-risk applications in new towers.
UAE regulatory evolution
Don't just ban. Control the risk.
The UAE progressively strengthened the way exterior walls are regulated.
The framework goes beyond a simple product name and deals with classification, complete assemblies, testing, approval, inspection and stakeholder responsibility.
Aluminium Composite Panels remain a recognised product category when the required material and system performance is demonstrated.
Material classification
Exterior materials must satisfy defined fire-performance requirements appropriate to their application.
ACP / MCM specifically addressed
Metal Composite Materials including Aluminium Composite Panels are specifically considered within UAE facade requirements.
A1 and A2 solutions
Modern mineral-core ACP technology can provide substantially different reaction-to-fire performance from legacy PE-core products.
Complete assembly testing
Material classification does not remove the need to understand the performance of the intended wall assembly.
Inspection
Approval must connect with what is actually delivered and installed on the building.
Stakeholder accountability
Consultants, contractors, suppliers, owners and other stakeholders have defined responsibilities.
Enforcement
The revised framework introduced stronger inspections, penalties and legal consequences for non-compliance.
Existing buildings
Older buildings remain an important part of the safety challenge because many were constructed before stronger requirements.
Australia
Remediation matters. So does the cavity.
After Lacrosse and later Grenfell, Australia undertook extensive audits, regulatory changes and remediation of combustible cladding.
Victoria created a major dedicated cladding remediation programme.
That work is important. But replacing an outer panel should not stop us asking how the entire wall controls fire and smoke.
2014
Lacrosse Tower
Fire spread rapidly over the ACP facade after starting on a balcony. The incident became a defining Australian combustible-cladding case.
2019
Neo200
Fire spread vertically along an ACP strip. CSIRO's detailed review records the building, fire development and available evidence.
RESPONSE
Cladding Safety Victoria
Victoria established a risk-based programme to identify, prioritise and remediate buildings with combustible cladding.
LESSON
Risk is not a product name.
Building risk depends on material, quantity, configuration, geometry and the other fire-safety measures present in the building.
A question worth discussing
What happens behind the cladding?
A ventilated facade intentionally contains an air cavity.
If fire enters that cavity, buoyant hot gases can move upward. This is why cavity geometry, compartmentation and appropriately designed cavity barriers deserve the same serious attention as the outer panel.
CSIRO's review noted that Australian requirements did not historically contain one simple general cavity-barrier rule applying to every external-wall situation.
Particular compliance pathways, including the relevant external-wall verification approach, do require cavity barriers to be incorporated and represented in testing.
So my question is simple: if we replace a combustible outer panel with a non-combustible one but ignore another possible route for fire spread, have we understood the complete problem?
This is not an argument against remediation. It is an argument for complete-system thinking.
Think beyond the panel
Nothing here sits alone.
The facade is an assembly. Its fire behaviour depends on how different components interact.
01
Cladding
Composition, core technology, thickness and reaction to fire.
02
Insulation
Material, thickness, location and tested configuration.
03
Cavity
Depth, ventilation and potential routes for hidden fire movement.
04
Cavity barriers
Position, continuity, activation and correct installation.
05
Substructure
Rails, brackets, interfaces and wall geometry.
06
Openings
Windows, slab edges, penetrations and fire stopping.
07
Evidence
Test reports, classifications, certification and their limitations.
08
Installation
What was actually installed compared with what was approved.
09
Decision
Someone ultimately accepts what goes onto the building.
A pressure I see everywhere
Cheaper. Faster. But understand the consequence.
Construction is always under pressure.
Reduce the price. Finish faster. Approve the alternative. Meet the programme. Value engineer the specification.
There is nothing wrong with saving money or improving efficiency. Every project has a budget.
But when a safety-critical specification changes, the technical consequence must be understood before the commercial benefit is accepted.
A cheaper product is not automatically equivalent. A changed insulation can change a tested assembly. Removing a fire barrier can change fire behaviour. A certificate for one configuration may not cover another.
Price and completion pressure are real. So is the responsibility attached to the decisions made under that pressure.
Accountability
Someone must own the decision.
Strong codes matter. Good materials matter. Testing matters. Certification matters.
But safety can still fail if responsibility becomes so fragmented that everybody assumes somebody else checked the critical issue.
Where investigators and courts establish wrongdoing, accountability should follow through due process and the law.
My role is not to decide guilt. My interest is in understanding the decisions early enough that another tragedy can be prevented.
01
Who specified it?
Was the required performance clearly understood?
02
Who changed it?
If the design changed, was the consequence evaluated?
03
Who approved it?
Did the approver understand the evidence and its scope?
04
Who checked it?
Was the final installation verified against the approved solution?
Decision Observer
Materials don't make decisions.
People do.
This question has stayed with me for years.
I do not want the discussion to disappear when the headlines disappear.
That is why I initiated DECISION Observer.
I want to speak openly with engineers, architects, fire professionals, manufacturers, laboratories, certification bodies, consultants, contractors, regulators, researchers, building owners and anyone willing to understand.
Not to defend a material. Not to attack another. Not to determine legal guilt.
To understand what happened, what was known, what was decided and what we can do better next time.
Open conversations
Conversations that shape better decisions.
Real incidents.
Real evidence.
Difficult questions.
Different viewpoints.
Lessons we should not forget.
Why this matters to me
This is not only an engineering topic. People live in these buildings. Children sleep in them. Families trust that someone made the right decisions before they moved in. For me, this is a lifelong mission.
I have spent twenty years around Aluminium Composite Panels and facades. The more I learn, the more responsibility I feel to keep asking questions. I want to continue learning, testing, sharing and discussing these decisions for as long as I can. If one better-informed decision helps prevent another avoidable tragedy, the conversation was worth it.